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Thinker · 1908 CE–2000 CE

W. V. O. Quine

Quine challenged the logical-empiricist orthodoxy of his teachers, most influentially in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951), where he attacked the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism, defended a holistic picture of empirical confirmation, and developed a naturalized epistemology that treats philosophy as continuous with, rather than prior to, empirical science.

Intellectual setting

Quine studied at Harvard under Whitehead, traveled to Vienna, Warsaw, and Prague in the early 1930s where he engaged the Vienna Circle logical positivists, and then spent his career at Harvard, where his students and colleagues, including Donald Davidson and Hilary Putnam, helped make it a center of postwar American analytic philosophy.

Key ideas

Rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction

In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Quine argued that no principled, non-circular criterion separates truths knowable by meaning alone (analytic) from truths knowable by empirical fact (synthetic), undermining a cornerstone of logical positivism and reshaping twentieth-century philosophy of language and epistemology.

Confirmation holism and ontological relativity

Quine held that our statements about the world face "the tribunal of experience" not individually but as a corporate body (confirmation holism), and in "Word and Object" he argued that ontological commitment is relative to a chosen theoretical framework, illustrated by the indeterminacy of radical translation.

Legacy

Quine's critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction and his naturalized epistemology reoriented American analytic philosophy away from logical positivism toward naturalism and philosophy of science, decisively influencing Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, and the broader trajectory of twentieth-century philosophy of language, logic, and epistemology.